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Abstract Arming uninhabited vehicles (UVs) is an
increasing trend. Widespread deployment can bring dan-
gers for arms-control agreements and international
humanitarian law (IHL). Armed UVs can destabilise the
situation between potential opponents. Smaller systems can
be used for terrorism. Using a systematic definition existing
international regulation of armed UVs in the fields of arms
control, export control and transparency measures is
reviewed; these partly include armed UVs, but leave large
gaps. For preventive arms control a general prohibition of
armed UVs would be best. If that is unattainable, several
measures should be taken. An explicit prohibition of
autonomous attack, that is without a human decision,
should be added to IHL. Concerning armed UVs remotely
controlled by a human soldier, recommendations differ
according to type or mission. New kinds of uninhabited
nuclear-weapon carriers should be banned. Space weapons
should be prohibited in general. UVs smaller than
0.2–0.5 m should be banned. Bigger remotely controlled
armed UVs not equipped with weapons of mass destruction
should be subject to numerical limitations in various cat-
egories. For these the Treaty on Conventional Armed
Forces in Europe is an important precedent.
Keywords Unmanned vehicle  Uninhabited vehicle 
Military robot  Arms control  Disarmament  UAV 
UGV  USV  UUV  UMS
Introduction
When thinking of ethical issues linked to armed vehicles
without a human operator on board arguments about the law
of armed conflict (also called international humanitarian
law, or ius in bello in the traditional just-war theory, Walzer
1977) come to mind first, and the discussion in the scientific
literature has mostly focused on these issues (e.g. Asaro
2008; Sparrow 2007; Lin et al. 2009; Krishnan 2009: Ch. 5).1
They are about behaviour when war takes place. However,
there is an important other dimension: the prevention of war
in the first place, following the prohibition of violence
between states enshrined in the UN Charter2 and the pre-
rogative of peace contained in many other international
documents.3 (In the ius ad bellum part of just-war theory one
can find this dimension in the strict conditions for when it
can be justified to go to war.) Acknowledging that the
preparations for war can make war more likely (one aspect
of the so-called security dilemma),4 the international
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1 See also many articles in this issue and the references given there.
2 Paragraphs 3 and 4 of Art. 2 of the UN Charter read (UN Charter
1945): ‘‘3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by
peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and
security, and. justice, are not endangered.’’ ‘‘4. All Members shall
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state,
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations.’’.
3 For example in the preambles of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (1968) and the Vienna Document 1999 of the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe.
4 In a basically anarchic international system the states maintain
armed forces for their security, thereby creating mutual threats and
overall diminishing the security of all. One way out of the security
dilemma is agreed limitation of forces (arms control) with adequate
verification of compliance.
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community has long declared the goal of ‘‘general and
complete disarmament under strict international control’’.5
Unfortunately the mechanisms prescribed in the UN Charter
for maintaining the peace and stopping aggression have
mostly not yet been implemented,6 and states continue to
more rely on self-defence allowed in Art. 51 ‘‘if an armed
attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until
the Security Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security’’.
Even though general and complete disarmament has
remained on the rhetorical level, partial measures of arms
limitations have been agreed upon during the Cold War as
well as soon after its end. Concerning nuclear armaments
arms-control treaties were concluded between the USA and
the Soviet Union/Russia,7 other aspects were regulated by
multilateral or global treaties.8
Different from the ethics of armed conflict, the ethics of
arms control is not often discussed explicitly.9 It has been a
sideline in much of the debate about the ethical dimensions
of nuclear deterrence (e.g. Dean 1982; Fisher 1985: Ch. 9;
Finnis et al. 1987: Chs. XII, XIII). In recent years, raising the
ethical awareness of life-science researchers has become a
major concern of the states parties to the Biological and
Toxin Weapons Convention (e.g. Millett 2011). While there
is little doubt that chemical and biological weapons of mass
destruction are outlawed rightly and the conviction is rising
that nuclear weapons should be prohibited too (see many
statements by former and present high-level politicians and
military officers), conventional weapons can increase the
likelihood of war in their own right (and, as long as nuclear
weapons exist, conventional war between nuclear states or
their allies brings the risk of escalation to nuclear war). If
new classes of conventional weapons are emerging, as is the
case with armed uninhabited vehicles, they should be
assessed with respect to questions such as: Do they make war
more likely? Do they raise other dangers? Envisioned short-
term military advantages should be weighed against proba-
ble long-term consequences for national and in particular
international security.
Several arms-control treaties contain preventive ele-
ments, that is they prohibit or limit potential future weap-
ons or technologies, often by including not only
deployment and use, but also development and testing.10
Such preventive arms control is advisable whenever a new
military technology can endanger peace, in particular sta-
bility between potential opponents, international humani-
tarian law, or bring dangers to society or the environment
already in peacetime (see ‘‘Reasons for armed-UV arms
control’’). Finding out if such criteria are fulfilled is one of
the subjects of military-technology assessment.
Uninhabited vehicles (UVs) promise many military
advantages.11 They are already widely used, at present mainly
air vehicles (UAVs) for surveillance and reconnaissance,12
ground and water UVs are less advanced.13 The trend of
arming UVs is spreading to more countries.14 For the time
being, weapons release is done under remote control, with a
‘‘human in the loop’’. However, the US military are discussing
about the option of autonomous machine attack (e.g. Canning
2006; US DoD 2007, 54; US DoD 2009, 10) and have funded
research in this direction (Arkin 2009; Lin et al. 2009);
recently the US Department of Defense has issued a directive
on ‘‘autonomy in weapon systems’’ (US DoD 2012).
Thus analyses about potential dangers from armed UVs
and options for preventive arms control are urgently needed.
Some literature exists already, but much of it remains on a
general level. In the context of military-technology
5 Various resolutions of the UN General Assembly (e.g. UN GA
1961); taken up in the preambles of many arms-control and
disarmament treaties, e.g. the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention (BTWC 1972).
6 This holds for making available armed forces to the Security
Council, holding immediately available national air-force contin-
gents, and the establishment of the Military Staff Committee (Arts.
43–47). In recent cases when the UN Security Council was not
blocked by a veto, it has entitled unspecified states to take military
action, for example with the authorisation of an International Security
Assistance Force for Afghanistan (UN SC 2001). UN peace-keeping
operations are different since they occur with the consent of the
concerned parties; they are not mentioned in the Charter.
7 Most recently in the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty of 2010.
8 Multilateral: e.g. Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
(1990), now heavily endangered; global: e.g. Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention (1972), Chemical Weapons Convention (1993),
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (1996). For a systematic
presentation see e.g. Goldblat (2002).
9 One can make the point that the criterion ‘‘war as the last resort’’ of
the ius ad bellum part of just-war theory (Walzer 1977) can be linked
to arms control if the security dilemma is added to the considerations.
10 The most important examples: Nuclear-weapon tests are prohib-
ited by the nuclear Test Ban Treaties (Partial 1963, Comprehensive
1996). Development is explicitly included in the list of prohibited
activities in the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (1972)
and the Chemical Weapons Convention (1993).
11 The US DoD (2009: 19–20) mentions: replacement of humans in
dull, dirty or dangerous missions; for UAVs: higher survivability,
increased endurance, tolerance to higher G-forces, smaller sizes and
thus signatures; for maritime and ground UVs: force multiplication
and risk reduction.
12 More than 75 countries operate, develop, manufacture or export
uninhabited air vehicles, most of them unarmed (US GAO 2012, see
also Daly 2008, 2010).
13 With the exception of small uninhabited ground vehicles for bomb
disposal, remotely controlled from up to a kilometre (US DoD 2009:
App. B).
14 Daly (2010) contains 11 countries (plus the ‘‘International’’
category) with UAV types that are or could be armed, including
development projects. At present, the USA, UK, Israel and Iran seem
to be the only countries with deployed armed UAVs; the UK flies US
types (RAF 2012). A Chinese producer is keen on exporting ‘‘attack
drones’’ (Wan and Finn 2011).
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assessment of microsystems technology Altmann (2001: Chs.
6–8) recommended a ban of mini-/micro-robots. Discussing
military nanotechnology applications under criteria of pre-
ventive arms control, Altmann and Gubrud (2004) and
Altmann (2006: Chs. 5–7) recommended a general prohibi-
tion of armed UVs; if that is not achievable, they demanded
bans on autonomous attack, on small UVs, on qualitatively
new types of nuclear-weapon carriers and on space weapons.
Altmann (2009, 2012) has given a relatively detailed assess-
ment of (armed and unarmed) UVs under preventive-arms-
control criteria together with preliminary recommendations
for arms control along the lines of Altmann (2001, 2006).
Citing many sources, Sparrow (2009) gave a series of argu-
ments for arms control for ‘‘robotic weapons’’ and proposed to
start a discussion about it. He recommended restrictions on the
range and mission length, or a prohibition of peacetime
deployment close to other countries; at least the destructive
capacity of long-range UVs should be restricted and the drive
toward autonomy should be resisted. Pointing at dangerous
scenarios but sceptical of a complete ban of armed military
robots, Krishnan (2009: Ch. 6) discussed various options for
limitations of autonomous weapons; his arguments are con-
sidered in ‘‘Options and recommendations for armed-
UV arms control’’ below. The International Committee for
Robot Arms Control, founded 2009, proposed consideration
of a ban on autonomous armed UVs and of limitations on
‘‘man in the loop’’ systems (ICRAC 2009). The International
Expert Workshop ‘‘Arms Control for Robots’’ demanded a
prohibition of autonomous weapons (plus new kinds of
nuclear-weapon carriers and robotic space weapons) and
quantitative as well as qualitative restrictions of armed tele-
operated UVs (Statement 2010, co-signed by A. Krishnan).
A group of US researchers has pointed to the military
pressures for autonomous lethal robots and has called for a
discussion of policies and possible restrictions (Marchant
et al. 2011). Repeating the arguments from Arkin (2009)—
who is a co-author—they state: ‘‘The trend is clear: War-
fare will continue and autonomous robots will ultimately
be deployed in the conduct of warfare’’. They mention
several narrow as well as broad ethical and policy aspects.
The parts on governance provide a menu of restrictions
found in international arms-control instruments and of soft
law, such as codes of conduct, transgovernmental dialogue,
information sharing. As hybrid form possibly leading from
soft to formal law a Framework Convention could be
agreed upon within which more substantive protocols could
be developed gradually. No specific recommendation is
given, but it seems that a ban of autonomous lethal robots
is not among the solutions envisioned.15
One can state that arguments for arms control for armed
UVs have been laid out in quite some detail and that most
of the existing literature has gravitated to a common set of
demands, most of them on a general level. They provide
important guidelines but a detailed treatment how existing
arms control affects armed UVs and how gaps should be
closed is still missing. This article aims to investigate these
issues.
I take the prerogative of peace, the UN Charter, the
goals of disarmament and arms control and international
humanitarian law as the ethical/moral foundation. Under
conditions of the security dilemma, in order to achieve
adherence to moral imperatives with respect to armed
forces and preparations for war, usually legally binding
international treaties are required (arms control in the
narrow sense), mostly with measures for verification of
compliance. Sometimes only politically binding agree-
ments are concluded (arms control in the wider sense, for
export control or transparency measures).
Arms control depends on clear notions of the military
systems in question. Thus, in the following ‘‘Nomenclature
and definitional issues’’, I consider definitional issues.
‘‘Reasons for armed-UV arms control’’ summarises reasons
for arms control of armed UVs. ‘‘Existing international
regulation’’ explains how armed (UVs) are covered by
existing arms-limitation agreements, export-control
regimes and transparency/confidence-building measures.
‘‘Options and recommendations for armed-UV arms con-
trol’’ presents options and recommendations for preventive
arms control, and ‘‘Conclusion’’ gives conclusions.
Nomenclature and definitional issues
For considerations about limitations and in particular for
the contents of arms-control treaties the categories of
military systems are important; even more important are
the definitions of the categories.
In particular with uninhabited aircraft many different
terms have been used, for example drone, remotely piloted
vehicle, air robot, unmanned aerial vehicle. For a system-
atic approach one can follow the nomenclature of the US
Department of Defense (DoD) which in its attempt to join
the activities of the armed services speaks of ‘‘unmanned
15 This is not the place for a detailed critique, but three aspects should
be mentioned: The text is somewhat inconsistent in that it accepts that
autonomous lethal robots will be deployed but is open towards any
Footnote 15 continued
solution that the international community will arrive at. The discus-
sion of existing arms-control treaties is on a general level, in partic-
ular the CFE-Treaty inclusion of armed UVs is not mentioned (see
‘‘Existing arms-control treaties’’ of the present article). The compar-
ison with many international technology-governance mechanisms
neglects the special conditions that hold for limitation of military uses
of technologies (mainly friction with the goal of victory should war
occur and the need for verification while protecting military secrets,
see Altmann (2006): Sect. 5.1).
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vehicles’’, with sub-categories according to the medium:
‘‘unmanned air/ground/maritime (/surface/undersea) vehi-
cles’’ with the acronyms UAV/UGV/UMV(/USV/UUV).
The notion ‘‘unmanned systems’’ (UMS) with ‘‘unmanned
air systems’’ (UAS) etc. is used to include other compo-
nents, such as a ground control station, a data link, a
maintenance set and, for some, launch equipment. I follow
this usage here, but for gender neutrality will rather speak
of ‘‘uninhabited vehicles’’. For completeness outer-space
vehicles have to be added, and one has to keep in mind that
there can be vehicles capable of moving in more than one
medium, for example transatmospheric ones as envisioned
by the USA for the so-called ‘‘Prompt Global Strike’’ (e.g.
Sanger and Shanker 2010). The ‘‘robot’’ notion is avoided,
because it is too unspecific—on the one hand it has con-
notations to humanoid forms and autonomy, on the other it
is also used for fixed industrial robots.
The definitions used here follow a systematic and gen-
eric approach:
An uninhabited vehicle (UV) is a vehicle which does not
carry a human operator. Usually its motion can be
controlled and in most cases it is powered.
A vehicle is an (at least partly) artificial object which can
move—on land, at sea, in air or outer space—and can
carry something.
An uninhabited vehicle is denoted as armed if it carries a
weapon or acts as a weapon, weapon meaning a device
for physical damage or bodily harm.
An autonomous armed UV is one that can select targets
and attack them without human decision or participation
(except for a general authorisation).
(The UV definition of the US DoD is narrower and
arbitrarily excludes certain categories that are clearly
uninhabited/unmanned and are vehicles, such as ballistic
and cruise missiles, torpedoes and satellites.16 The DoD
definition of an autonomous weapon system is similar to
the one given here for an autonomous armed UV.17) The
definition chosen excludes immobile armed robots as
already deployed at the demilitarised zone between South
and North Korea and which may find future use at
perimeters of sites.18
Despite the effort to be systematic, some grey areas are
unavoidable,19 and additional clarification will be needed
now and then. Since the trend towards armed UVs is
mostly about new types, it is sensible to focus consider-
ations and limitation mostly on these, keeping in mind that
the other, established classes need to be included in the
regulation to avoid loopholes.
Reasons for armed-UV arms control
Armed UVs can bring dangers in many respects; mention
has been made, among others, of a play-station mentality
among the operators, an increased propensity in particular
of democracies to war, an increased likelihood of acci-
dental war, violations of IHL or international human-rights
law (e.g. Asaro 2008; Sparrow 2009; Singer 2009; Krish-
nan 2009; Sharkey 2010; Sauer and Scho¨rnig 2012; Shar-
key in press). The dangers are summarised here in short,
following the systematic assessment under the criteria of
preventive arms control by Altmann (2009, 2012). These
criteria can be used to find out whether preventive limita-
tion of a new technology, system or material with potential
military relevance should be considered. The criteria have
been categorised in three groups: 1. Adherence to and
further development of effective arms control, disarma-
ment and international law; 2. Maintain and improve sta-
bility, 3. Protect humans, environment and society
(Altmann 2006: Ch. 5 and references).
In the area of arms control and disarmament, new
nuclear-armed UAVs could undermine the rules on cruise
missiles and bombers of the New Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty between the USA and Russia (New START 2010).
Nuclear hypervelocity missiles and transatmospheric
vehicles—which would fly aerodynamically over a signif-
icant portion of their trajectories—could do the same with
16 The definition reads (US DoD 2007: 1, emphasis original):
‘‘Unmanned Vehicle. A powered vehicle that does not carry a
human operator, can be operated autonomously or remotely, can be
expendable or recoverable, and can carry a lethal or nonlethal payload.
Ballistic or semi-ballistic vehicles, cruise missiles, artillery projectiles,
torpedoes, mines, satellites, and unattended sensors (with no form of
propulsion) are not considered unmanned vehicles. Unmanned vehicles
are the primary component of unmanned systems.’’
The US DoD is not fully consistent in listing (unpowered) tethered
aerostats and mentioning manipulation arms for outer space (US DoD
2007: 97–102, 43). The exclusion of artillery projectiles (without
capability to change the trajectory), mines and unattended sensors
(both immobile) makes sense technically. But ballistic missiles carry
a payload (as do space-launch ‘‘vehicles’’), there are clear similarities
between cruise missiles (in the future with in-flight re-targeting) and
some new types of UAV (using a launch rail, expendable) as well as
between torpedoes and new UUVs. Functional satellites do need to
control their orbit actively.
17 ‘‘[A]utonomous weapon system. A weapon system that, once
activated, can select and engage targets without further intervention
by a human operator. This includes human-supervised autonomous
weapon systems that are designed to allow human operators to
override operation of the weapon system, but can select and engage
targets without further human input after activation.’’ (US DoD 2012).
18 Problems from immobile armed robots are much smaller than from
mobile ones (that is, armed UVs). Specific regulation for the former
could be attached to armed-UV regulation.
19 For example: Where is the transition from a ballistic projectile to a
(guided) vehicle? What is the minimum amount of implanted artifact
that would make a (natural) animal a vehicle in the present sense?
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respect to the ballistic missiles. Nuclear UAVs with ranges
between 500 and 5,500 km would endanger the Interme-
diate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty 1987,
between USA and Soviet Union/Russia) that prohibits
nuclear ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles in
this range interval (INF Treaty 1987)—the introducing
country would probably argue that such UAVs are no
cruise missiles. Introduction of nuclear intermediate-range
UAVs by other countries—that are not bound by the INF
Treaty—would raise the question how long USA and
Russia would keep the Treaty alive. Conventionally armed
UVs in Europe fall under the Treaty on Conventional
Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty 1990) as discussed in
‘‘Existing international regulation’’ below, but if some of
them get smaller than traditional systems arguments will
probably be made that they should count differently,
leading to grey areas and complicated discussions. Also
here developments outside of Europe can contribute to
undermining.
Concerning arms control in outer space, uninhabited
satellites for docking, servicing and manipulation provide
possibilities for anti-satellite attack, endangering the gen-
eral ban on space weapons that the international commu-
nity is requesting since decades.
With respect to international humanitarian law (IHL),
malfunctioning UVs must not produce (civilian) damage.
A positive factor of armed U(A)Vs in respect of discrim-
ination is that their attacks can be better directed than
artillery and aerial bombs and that they allow real-time
assessment of a scene with immediate reaction to changes;
both can reduce collateral damage. On the other hand,
experiences with US attacks in Afghanistan, Iraq and
Pakistan show that often civilians are attacked and killed;
obviously the video image from a considerable distance
does not allow to identify a person or to reliably recognise
a weapon. The distance from the scene and the computer-
game-like interface—being in an office environment in the
home country—can make shooting easier. But a pilot of a
combat aircraft is also removed from his/her target, and
different from the former the UAV operator can look at the
results of the attack for much longer (at least in very
asymmetric settings where the opponent has no means of
threatening the UAV). Obviously soldiers on the ground
could act much more discriminately—checking the identity
of persons, searching for weapons, arresting someone—
whereas aircraft—with or without crew on board—have
attack as their only action possibility.
Autonomous machine decision when and whom to attack
(Arkin 2009) will for a long time not be possible at the
intelligence level of a human commander (Sharkey 2010, in
press, see also ‘‘Limitation or ban of autonomous armed
UVs’’)—and this is what IHL requires. Earlier introduction
of autonomous attack—a possible consequence of various
military pressures—would thus endanger IHL.
That UVs can be used to carry weapons of mass
destruction, with UAVs the main option, provides another
argument to consider preventive arms control.
Armed UVs can destabilise the military situation
between potential opponents—that is, increase pressures to
attack or react fast—in several respects. Some UAVs can
penetrate deeply with little chance of being detected or
defended against, for carrying out precision surprise
attacks. Without humans on board they could be sent more
easily and for more dangerous missions. Destabilisation
would be higher if the payload might consist of weapons of
mass destruction.
In a crisis, in a situation when both opponents command
armed UVs and when both fleets meet at short distance, they
would observe each other on high alert. Because a co-ordi-
nated first attack could destroy many opponent UVs, shoot-
ing could start on any indication of attack, including
erroneous signals. Thus war could start by uncontrolled
feedback cycles between the two systems of warning and
attack, in particular if they would work in autonomous mode.
Instability at the highest levels would follow if swarms
of highly precise conventionally armed small UAVs could
threaten nuclear-strategic targets, if small satellites could
take out satellites for strategic warning, surveillance and
communication, or if—in the later future—microrobots
could enter military systems of an opponent covertly, to
disrupt the electronics at any time.
A technological arms race in qualitative and quantita-
tive terms has already started with armed UAVs and will
soon include more countries. Armed UVs for land and sea
will follow. As more countries will deploy armed UVs, this
will drive efforts for defence against them and vice versa.
Horizontal and vertical proliferation of armed UAVs has
started, too, and—absent international limitations—will
accelerate likewise. At present there is international concern
about proliferation to non-state actors, but due to their
resources and (internal) power states will probably create
bigger proliferation problems. In turn, non-state actors may
receive armed UVs from states, in particular more advanced
ones than they could fabricate by themselves. Thus, even
though non-state actors will not become parties to interna-
tional agreements, limitation among states would go a long
way in preventing access by non-state actors.
Already in peacetime dangers to humans and dangers to
society could ensue if armed UVs would fall into the hands
of criminals. In particular small UAVs could make ideal
terrorist tools, either for selectively attacking important
persons or for mass destruction by distributing biological
agents. If military systems will have been designed for such
purposes the dangers would be higher.
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In sum there are strong concerns about armed UVs. Seen
from a viewpoint of peace and international security plus
security within societies, most of the concerns seem more
important than the military advantages they can bring for
the combat effectiveness of individual armed forces. Thus,
there are strong arguments for including armed UVs into
(preventive) arms control.
Existing international regulation
Armed uninhabited vehicles for land, water, air or outer
space do not exist in a complete legal vacuum; on the
contrary, beside IHL,20 they are already subject to some
arms-control treaties, to export control regimes and to
transparency measures. But the existing regulation leaves
important gaps that should be closed.
Existing arms-control treaties
Arms-control treaties usually are concluded as legally
binding agreements compliance with which is verified by
the treaty parties or an international organisation. From the
existing treaties at first the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention (BTWC 1972) and the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC 1993)—of which nearly all states are
members—have to be mentioned (BTWC 1972; CWC
1993). These Conventions probibit all such weapons
including carrier and dispensing systems, thus UVs must
not be equipped with them.
The Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty
(1987) is bilateral, between the USA and the Soviet Union/
Russia (INF Treaty 1987). For these two countries it pro-
hibits land-based nuclear long-range cruise missiles as well
as land-based nuclear ballistic missiles between 500 and
5,500 km range. Its effects on armed UVs are thus limited
(all the more because the US Department of Defense does
not count cruise and ballistic missiles as UVs).
The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New
START 2010) between Russia and USA allows new types
of strategic nuclear-weapons carriers, the only obligation is
to notify and exhibit them to the other party (New START
2010). In the USA there is a discussion if the next gener-
ation of nuclear bombers should be uninhabited (Lowther
2009). This would not be constrained by the Treaty.
On the other hand, the Treaty on Conventional Armed
Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty 1990, adapted 1999) con-
tains relevant restrictions (CFE 1990, 1999). The Treaty
was concluded between the member states of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the former
Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO, dissolved in 1991)
and holds for their European territories from the Atlantic to
the Urals.21 The CFE Treaty limits five major categories of
conventional armament: battle tanks, armoured combat
vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters.
For each category there are limits for the holdings in the
member states.22 When the Treaty text was elaborated, the
negotiators took possible future development of uninhab-
ited combat vehicles into account. Consciously they
designed the definitions of the categories in such a way that
they are independent of whether there is a crew on board or
not. According to Article II par. 1 of the Treaty,
‘‘Battle tanks are tracked armoured fighting vehicles
which weigh at least 16.5 metric tonnes unladen
weight and which are armed with a 360-degree tra-
verse gun of at least 75 mm calibre.’’ (Section (C))23
‘‘The term ‘combat aircraft’ means a fixed-wing or
variable-geometry wing aircraft armed and equipped
to engage targets by employing guided missiles,
unguided rockets, bombs, guns, cannons, or other
weapons of destruction, as well as any model or
version of such an aircraft which performs other
military functions such as reconnaissance or elec-
tronic warfare.’’ (Section (K))24
Similarly, the definitions of a ‘‘heavy armament combat
vehicle’’ (Section (D)) and of combat/attack helicopters
(Sections (L)–(O)) do not mention persons on board. In
addition to the definitions there is a Protocol on Existing
Types of Conventional Armaments and Equipment where
the states list their types of Treaty-limited weapons and
carriers. This Protocol is to be updated periodically.
The definitions of the land vehicles contain minimum
masses and gun calibres so that new uninhabited types
below these thresholds are not constrained by the Treaty
and could be deployed in unlimited numbers. The defini-
tions of combat aircraft and combat/attack helicopters, on
the other hand, are independent of mass or size. Taken
verbatim they hold also for small and very small armed
uninhabited aircraft. Thus, all such mini-/micro aircraft
would count, and the states would have to remove one
20 For a discussion of armed UAVs under IHL see e.g. Boothby
(2011).
21 Today the Eastern side has been reduced to Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine while
several former WTO states have joined NATO.
22 In addition to the limitations in the five categories, the Treaty
stipulates information exchanges on other systems such as armoured
personnel carrier look-alikes, armoured vehicle-launched bridges,
trainer aircraft, transport helicopters. These are subject to inspections
as well.
23 Strictly speaking the kilogram and the ton are units of mass, not
weight which is a force for which the unit is Newton. Thus I use
‘‘mass’’ except in verbatim quotes.
24 The definitions contain some additional explanations.
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large armed air vehicle for each newly introduced small
one.
Unfortunately the CFE Treaty—that was adapted in
1999 to the situation after the Cold War—is suspended
since 2007 (Schmidt 2008); its Protocol on Existing Types
of Conventional Armaments and Equipment (POET) was
not updated since 1997.25 The Treaty should be re-acti-
vated or modernised urgently (Schmidt and Hartmann
2011). In particular the POET should be updated regularly.
However, uninhabited combat vehicles introduced in
Europe in the future can be notified and subjected to on-site
inspections independently.26
But even if this were done, the regulation would remain
limited to Europe. No comparable treaties exist in other
regions of the world so that armed UVs can be introduced
there in unlimited numbers.
The Outer Space Treaty (1967) prohibits weapons of
mass destruction on space objects, independent of whether
there is a crew on board or not (OST 1967). Other space
weapons are not yet prohibited, unfortunately, and the
moratorium on anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons that the USA
and Russia have kept in the 1980s and early 1990s is no
longer valid, with ASAT capabilities provided by ballistic-
missile defence systems and a first ASAT test by China
(Grego 2012).
Export control
Contrary to arms-control treaties export-control agreements
are not legally, but only politically binding. They rather
establish guidelines. The individual decision about
approval or denial of an export licence is made by the
respective state, potentially after consultation with others.
In the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) 34
countries have agreed to restrict exports of potential carrier
systems for mass destruction weapons. The members are
mainly Western countries plus Russia and Ukraine; other
missile exporters such as China, Israel, India, Iran, North
Korea or Pakistan are no members (China and Israel have
stated that they will adhere to the regime). Category I of the
MTCR contains items that should not be exported except in
rare cases; it contains, among others: ‘‘Complete unmanned
aerial vehicles systems (including cruise missiles, target
drones and reconnaissance drones) capable of delivering at
least a 500 kg ‘payload’ to a ‘range’ of at least 300 km’’
(MTCR 2011: 1.A.2). Category II lists items that can be
exported after consideration of six criteria to do with the
risk of misuse. Here UAV systems with at least 300 km
range are included, independent of payload (MTCR 2011:
19.A.2). If there is autonomous flight control or remote
control beyond visual range and the UAV ‘‘incorporates an
aerosol dispensing system/mechanism with a capacity
greater than 20 l’’ it falls under Category II likewise,
independent of its payload and range. In addition, the list
contains production facilities and many technologies rele-
vant for UVs, for example engines, autopilots, launch
systems, wind tunnels and test stands.27
Many more countries take part in the Hague Code of
Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC).
The 130 member states commit to export control and to
transparency measures, but only for ballistic missiles
(HCOC 2011). Cruise missiles and other armed UAVs are
not covered.
In the Wassenaar Arrangement 40 members have agreed
to control exports of conventional weapons and sensitive
dual-use goods and technologies ‘‘to regions and states
with situation/behavior representing serious concerns to the
members’’, to prevent ‘‘potentially destabilising accumu-
lations of conventional weapons’’. Its lists mention certain
robots,28 military UAVs (Wassenaar 2011: ML10),
unmanned submersible vehicles for depths below 1,000
m,29 underwater robots,30 UAVs with autonomous flight
control and navigation capability or remotely controlled
beyond visual range (Wassenaar 2011: 9.A.12) as well as
equipment and various technologies for these UVs. Also
here several important producing and exporting countries
do not participate.
Whereas the three regimes mentioned thus far are
asymmetric—the member countries use the respective
military systems and technologies themselves while trying
to block access by (some) others—there are also export
controls that are linked to near-universal treaties.31
To minimise the risk of chemical and biological weap-
ons proliferation while not impeding the ‘‘normal trade of
materials and equipment used for legitimate purposes’’, the
Australia Group (with 41 mostly Western members, all
25 Telephone communication with Zentrum fu¨r Verifikationsaufga-
ben der Bundeswehr, Geilenkirchen, Germany.
26 That the Predator and Reaper armed UAVs have not been notified
by the USA and UK up to now is due to the fact that they are
deployed in the Middle East, not in Europe from the Atlantic to the
Urals.
27 The UAV category 19.A.2. is mentioned at 30 different places
(MTCR 2011).
28 Robots for military use, robots protected against ballistic frag-
ments, or robots for work in an electromagnetic-pulse environment
(Wassenaar 2011: ML17.e).
29 Tethered: self-propelled or with fibre-optic data link; untethered:
autonomous course or acoustic or optic data link (Wassenaar 2011:
8.A.1).
30 With dedicated computer, controlled by force, torque or distance
sensors, or able to apply force C250 N or torque C250 NM using
titanium alloys or composite materials (Wassenaar 2011: 8.A.2.h).
31 The two export-control regimes connected to the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT, of 1968), the Nuclear Suppliers Group
(NSG 2011) and the Zangger Committee (Zangger 2011), concern
nuclear materials and equipment and are not directly relevant to UVs.
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parties to the CWC and the BTWC) has set up guidelines
and control lists. The ‘‘Control List of Dual-use Biological
Equipment and Related Technology and Software’’ men-
tions ‘‘spraying or fogging systems, specially designed or
modified for fitting to aircraft, lighter than air vehicles or
UAVs’’ as well as ‘‘aerosol generating units’’ for the same
if they are ‘‘capable of delivering, from a liquid suspension,
an initial droplet ‘VMD’ of less than 50 microns at a flow
rate of greater than two litres per minute’’ (VMD: volume
mean diameter), and related technology (Australia Group
2011a, b: I.8., II).32
While export controls can delay the proliferation of
armed UVs, they do not offer a sustainable solution,
because the producing states are not constrained in their
own armament and in exports to their allies and friends.
Transparency measures/confidence and security
building measures
Peace and security between potential opponents can be
supported by creating transparency. Confidence and secu-
rity building measures mostly do not contain limitations,
but can counteract exaggerated threat perceptions and
ensuing armament cycles and instability, and may lead to
more restraint.
Most notable is the Vienna Document 1999 (reissued
slightly updated 2011) (VD 2011) concluded in the
framework of the Organization for Security and Coopera-
tion in Europe (OSCE). The document is politically, not
legally binding; it includes limits on manoeuvre sizes and
verification by inspections. Among its many rules is annual
exchange of data relating to major weapon and equipment
systems, including new types, as well as of information on
plans for the deployment of such (VD 2011: Pars. 11–13).
This obviously applies to future armed UVs that would be
deployed in Europe.33
Another transparency measure is the United Nations
Register of Conventional Arms (UN Register 2007). Here
data on international transfers (and national holdings) of
arms are to be provided by the exporting as well as the
importing states. Not all countries report, and not all
reports are complete. The definitions of the weapons cat-
egories, transfers and holdings of which are to be reported,
are similar to the ones of the CFE Treaty,34 that is they
apply independently of whether there are persons on board
or not. In addition there are two categories ‘‘Warships’’ and
‘‘Missiles and missile launchers’’. The latter explicitly
contains ‘‘remotely piloted vehicles’’ with characteristics
of rockets, ballistic or cruise missiles ‘‘capable of deliv-
ering a warhead or weapon of destruction to a range of at
least 25 km’’.35,36
Gaps in international regulation
Even though armed UVs are included in existing arms-
control treaties, export-control regimes or transparency
measures, the regulation is far from satisfactory. There are
important deficiencies in all three areas, some apply more
generally than to UVs. Limits on nuclear-armed ballistic
and cruise missiles apply only to the USA and Russia, other
ballistic and cruise missiles are not covered at all. The CFE
Treaty does not hold outside of Europe. Maritime systems
are not covered at all. Export controls are asymmetric and
non-comprehensive. Transparency measures are not legally
binding and do not include limitation of arms.
Thus, in order to prevent or at least contain the dangers
mentioned in ‘‘Reasons for armed-UV arms control’’,
international treaties systematically limiting armed UVs
are needed on the global scale.
Options and recommendations for armed-UV arms
control
Complete ban on armed UVs
Considering that armed UVs bring the next arms-race wave,
can increase the probability of war, endanger IHL and
provide new possibilities for terrorist attacks, one is led to
the conclusion that it would be best to prohibit at least the
new ones outright from the beginning. To allow fast
agreement on the urgent issue states should not be required
to withdraw widely deployed, traditional systems. If the
general, systematic definition of UV from ‘‘Nomenclature
and definitional issues’’ is used, special exceptions would
32 The ‘‘Control List of Dual-Use Chemical Manufacturing Facilities
and Equipment and Related Technology and Software’’ (Australia
Group 2011a) is more specific and does not mention UVs.
33 Also here the USA and the United Kingdom have not provided
data on their armed Predator and Reaper UAVs because they are
deployed outside of Europe.
34 E.g. ‘‘Battle tanks: Tracked or wheeled self-propelled armoured
fighting vehicles with high cross-country mobility and a high-level of
self-protection, weighing at least 16.5 metric tons unladen weight,
Footnote 34 continued
with a high muzzle velocity direct fire main gun of at least 75 mm
calibre.’’ The other CFE-like categories are: Armoured combat
vehicles, Large-calibre artillery systems, Combat aircraft and Attack
helicopters.
35 Thus some armed UAVs may be covered doubly.
36 The UK has reported its holdings of Reaper UAVs since 2007
under Category ‘‘IV. Combat/Military Aircraft’’. For 2007 it reported
the import of two Reapers from the USA (which was not reported as
export by the USA) (UN SG 2008–2012).
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thus be needed for cruise missiles and ballistic missiles with
pre-programmed targets that exist already.37 Exceptions
should also be allowed for guided weapons with an auto-
matic shooting or launching mode or that search for a target,
if these weapons existed already in 2000, if target recog-
nition is simple and if human reaction is technically
excluded or would take too long; these weapons are mainly
torpedoes, systems for close-range ship defence and for air
defence. Unarmed UVs for reconnaissance, communication
etc. would not be limited. Verification could rely on on-site
inspections of sites with holdings of UVs and of testing and
training sites with close access to and demonstrations of the
vehicles so that inspectors can confirm that there are no
bomb bays and no hard points under the fuselage or the
wings of UAVs, no machine guns or the like on UGVs and
USVs, and that weapons release is neither tested nor trained.
For most countries this approach would be fully pre-
ventive—the USA, Israel, UK and Iran would have to
abolish some armed-UAV types introduced recently (only
very few land and sea systems have been deployed
already). However, given the big and increasing impor-
tance that the USA and UK, plus Israel, assign to attacks by
armed UVs in the Middle East it is improbable that they
will agree to such a comprehensive prohibition any time
soon. Then second-tier countries such as Russia and China,
but also other European NATO countries, would also not
want to preclude the armed-UV option. The unwillingness
of the USA is the main reason why Krishnan (2009: 157)
rejected a ban of armed robots.38 Pragmatically accepting
the difficulties of achieving a total ban on armed UVs the
2010 Berlin expert workshop restricted its demands to a
ban on autonomous attack and various limitations on
teleoperated armed UVs (Statement 2010).39 On the other
hand, foreign-troop withdrawal from Afghanistan has been
announced for 2014, so that urgent motives for military
UAV attacks to protect the US and UK troops will van-
ish.40 Principally it is conceivable that if the USA and UK
think long and hard about their own security, these coun-
tries could arrive at the conclusion that a ban is in their
long-term interest, but such a turn would occur only after a
long time (and maybe only after a catastrophic attack).
If a comprehensive ban cannot be attained, then quan-
titative limits are needed, for different categories. The
major categories are UVs for autonomous attack and those
that are remotely controlled.
Limitation or ban of autonomous armed UVs
Krishnan (2009: 162) argued that a ban on autonomous
weapons, demanding human control of weapon launch, is
not an effective strategy for arms control because states are
unlikely to agree on that and because verification, requiring
access to the robot control software and robot memory,
would be too intrusive. Nevertheless, to avoid some of the
dangers from autonomous weapons, the latter should be
restricted in some ways (Krishnan 2009: 161–165)41:
• A kill-box could be defined by co-ordinates after
reconnaissance would have confirmed that the box
contains only military targets. The weapon could only
attack within the box.
• Autonomous armed UVs should not be used among
civilians.
• The firepower and range should be limited.
• A safety switch should disable the weapon after some
time or if communication is lost permanently.
• A robot-anti-robot arms race leading to ever more
autonomy with decreasing predictability and human
control should be prevented by a prohibition of
evolving or self-learning software.
Assuming that autonomous armed UVs cannot be pre-
vented, it would be better to have such restrictions in place.
However, the first two ideas would remove much of the
military advantage that autonomous UVs promise by
requiring that first a force should make sure that a certain
area/volume box is free from civilians—maybe even by a
human looking at video from a reconnaissance UV in real
time, because the situation in the defined kill box may
change, for example a military target may change from
legitimate to illegitimate if a group of refugees approaches
it. The last proposal would be difficult to define in detail
(and to some extent runs counter to the explicit requirement
of learning from mistakes that has been proposed for lethal
autonomous robots).42 In addition verification that the
control software cannot evolve would be very difficult and
access to the software inside a given UV would need a
degree of intrusiveness that seems unrealistic, an argument
that is more applicable here than with autonomous attack in
37 Optimally long-range cruise missiles would be prohibited and
reduced to zero globally together with ballistic missiles which would
also supersede arguments for ballistic-missile defence. But this is for
the longer term—preventing new armed UVs (including new cruise
missiles) should have priority.
38 Further he argued against Western restraint because not all
countries would follow suit, creating pressures to counter robotic/
autonomous weapons, so that the West should better be in the lead.
39 The present author, while favouring a total ban, is a co-drafter and
co-signer of the Berlin Statement.
40 Targeted killings in Pakistan and elsewhere should not be seen as
an acceptable justification for keeping armed UAVs (Heyns 2012:
Sections IV D, V and refs).
41 His other recommendations (concerning police, private companies,
defensive postures, demilitarizing of artificial-intelligence research,
doomsday machines) are not discussed here mainly for space reasons.
42 Arkin (2009: Sect. 10.3) foresees an ‘‘ethical adaptor’’ that alters
its ethical base by after-action reflection, however only in an ever
more restrictive way.
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general where Krishnan used it to dismiss a ban. If
autonomous armed UVs will be introduced at all, a ‘‘robot-
anti-robot’’ arms race is bound to occur, with a slippery
slope where the trend toward increasing autonomy
including adaptive software would be difficult to stop.
Arkin (2009) has done research on autonomous lethal
robots with the goal of their conforming to IHL and ethi-
cally outperforming human soldiers. He states that ‘‘[i]t is
too early to tell whether this venture will be successful’’
and lists several ‘‘daunting problems remaining’’ (p. 211).
Referring to the basic requirements of IHL, Sharkey (2010)
writes that ‘‘[c]urrently and for the foreseeable future no
autonomous robots or artificial intelligence systems have
the necessary properties to enable discrimination between
combatants and civilians or to make proportionality deci-
sions.’’ Given that military motives with international
interactions could lead down the slippery slope towards
autonomous attack before the ‘‘daunting problems’’ would
have been solved, an explicit prohibition seems required, at
least for the next decades. But there is also the fundamental
question of giving a machine authority to decide on taking
of a human life.43
For both reasons a simple, basic rule should be intro-
duced into IHL: autonomous machine decisions on whom
or what to attack should be prohibited at all, absolutely
demanding a human in the decision chain for each single
weapon release. This has been the approach of the Berlin
Statement (2010)44 and can also be seen as one measure of
upholding the fundamental ethical demand of making sure
that humans remain in control over robots. Exceptions
could hold for automatic weapons that exist already as
discussed in ‘‘Complete ban on armed UVs’’. This general
rule would exclude the military personnel-saving advan-
tages of controlling many armed UVs by one human sol-
dier, and it would have to be upheld against military
pressures for faster reaction, but it seems justified by
important higher-priority arguments. The general principle
would hold for all media, including outer space, and would
obviously include nuclear weapons.
Since remotely controlled UVs could be changed to
autonomous mode by a simple software switch, verifying
the non-existence of an autonomous attack mode in
advance is hard. Hints could be gained from systematic
observation of UV testing and training operations. But even
if this were impossible: there is much IHL regulation that is
rather about behaviour in battle than about technical
properties of weapons—such as the general principle of
discrimination or the prohibition to use incendiary weapons
against civilians—and that can only be checked after the
fact, for example by forensic analysis. Forensic analysis in
the case of (new) armed UVs is strongly helped by the big
amount of sensor and communication data that flow
between the UV and the control station. As a corollary to
the prohibition of autonomous attack there should be an
obligation to record all sensor, communication and control
data around every attack by an armed UV and to make it
available shortly afterwards to the organisation responsible
for IHL, namely the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC), for checking compliance with the obligation
of human remote control.45 The ICRC is a strictly neutral
body and states are used to its visits to prisoner-of-war
camps and other, normally confidential, activities. Thus
acceptance of such investigations—that would not require
access to the UV control software—is conceivable.46
Limitations of remotely controlled armed UVs
Special categories
Some sub-categories of remotely controlled armed UVs
should be covered by special regulation:
Armed UVs for outer space need not be limited just
quantitatively—given the special difficulties in space and
the earlier moratorium on anti-satellite weapons a complete
prohibition is a realistic goal. Since most weapons in outer
space or for outer space would be uninhabited in the first
place, armed UVs for outer space are best covered by a
general ban of space weapons as proposed since decades
(e.g. Altmann and Scheffran 2003).47 Mistrust concerning
docking satellites should be prevented by rules of the road
and increased transparency.
Concerning UVs armed with nuclear weapons, the
existing ones with pre-programmed targets—that is, (land-
and sea-based) ballistic missiles and (air- and sea-based)
cruise missiles—should be reduced in the process of
nuclear disarmament, and no new kinds of nuclear-armed
UVs should be introduced. The third category of nuclear-
weapon carrier, armed bombers, should not be replaced by
uninhabited aircraft. Such rules can be incorporated into
the START follow-on treaty between the USA and Russia.
The other nuclear-weapon states should take on the same
obligations by their inclusion in nuclear-disarmament
treaties at an early stage.
43 This can be seen as an important part of making sure that humans
retain control over robots. On another level one can mention the
requirement of an interpersonal relation between the attacking human
and the victim (Sparrow 2011 and ref).
44 Which has been signed by A. Krishnan, too.
45 This concept was presented at the Berlin Workshop 2010 by P.
Asaro.
46 Many details would have to be defined and intense discussions can
be foreseen to make this concept workable and acceptable.
47 Note the recurring resolutions of the UN General Assembly
against an arms race in outer space (most recently UN GA 2012).
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Armed uninhabited transatmospheric vehicles would
introduce instability because of short flight times for very
long ranges and because they could carry a nuclear
weapon. Conventionally armed they would have very
limited effect at relatively high cost. Thus a complete
prohibition seems feasible and should be sought, either by a
global treaty or by one among the space-faring states.
Very small armed UVs—of centimetre, millimetre or
even smaller sizes—would bring particular dangers of
terrorist uses and would pose very difficult verification
problems. Unarmed types could be converted to armed
ones without easy recognisability. Thus a general prohi-
bition on UVs for all media that are smaller than
0.2–0.5 m, armed or not, military or not, is recom-
mended.48,49 Strictly limited exceptions should hold for
civilian purposes such as exploration of shattered
buildings.
For the other armed-UV categories (bigger than
0.2–0.5 m, non-nuclear, moving in/on land, sea or air, or
hybrid forms) quantitative limitations should be intro-
duced, optimally globally, potentially with some differen-
tiation by region, as discussed in the following subsections.
Refining the CFE Treaty
In Europe the minimum requirement is to uphold (and
revive) the CFE Treaty, counting armed land and air UVs
in the respective categories. In particular the Protocol on
Existing Types of Conventional Armaments and Equip-
ment should be updated regularly, reflecting the process of
introduction of armed UVs as it may unfold.
A few loopholes need to be closed and grey areas
minimised: The land-vehicle definitions contain minimum
criteria for unladen weight and calibre (16.5 metric tons for
battle tanks, 6.0 metric tons for heavy armoured combat
vehicles, 75 mm calibre for both). Armed land UVs below
these thresholds are not limited by the Treaty. Here new
categories should be introduced with maximum holdings at
least for UVs of lower weights that carry a cannon, maybe
even a heavy machine gun.50
The definitions of combat aircraft and combat/attack
helicopters, on the other hand, are independent of weight or
size. Taken verbatim any small and very small armed UAV
would count, and the states would have to ponder which
large aircraft they would like to forego for newly intro-
duced small ones. This is somewhat improbable, however.
When smaller armed uninhabited aircraft are to be intro-
duced, states will likely argue that these constitute new
categories for which additional numerical limits ought to
be negotiated; these could be much higher (thousands,
maybe tens of thousands) than those for traditional large
combat aircraft (hundreds to few thousand) and attack
helicopters (dozens to several hundred) (see Table 1).51
The numerical limits should be relatively stringent,
reflecting the objectives enshrined in the CFE-Treaty
preamble:
Establishing a secure and stable balance of conven-
tional armed forces in Europe at lower levels than
heretofore, of eliminating disparities prejudicial to
stability and security and of eliminating, as a matter
of high priority, the capability for launching surprise
attack and for initiating large-scale offensive action
in Europe.
New limits outside of Europe
The objectives of the CFE Treaty are useful for other
regions as well. In principle CFE-Treaty-like limitations of
conventional armament should be introduced outside of
Europe, in particular in potential crisis regions such as the
Near/Middle East and South Asia, including armed land
and air UVs along the lines proposed for Europe. However,
this would require solving very complicated political/mil-
itary problems, and maritime issues would probably have
to be addressed in parallel. Armed-UV developments are
proceeding too fast to allow waiting for comprehensive
conventional-force limitations. Thus a specific approach
focusing just on armed UVs is advisable. Elements of this
approach are described in the following. Armed UAVs are
most advanced and pose the strongest threats, so they
should have the first priority. UGVs come next, while
maritime UVs (USVs and UUVs) are less urgent. In order
to make possible fast conclusion of limitations on the new
kinds of armed UVs, the existing ones should be accepted
for the time being; their reduction/limitation needs more
progress and would take more time.52
New limits for armed UAVs
For limitation of armed uninhabited air vehicles it is sen-
sible to divide them into different categories: fixed-/
48 This prohibition should hold in general, also in case autonomous
armed UVs will not be banned.
49 Krishnan (2009: 165) has taken up this demand.
50 Small arms and light weapons are not limited by the CFE Treaty,
but if used in great numbers on UVs they could become a source of
threat and instability.
51 For possible criteria defining new sub-categories see ‘‘New limits
for armed UAVs’’.
52 This holds for nuclear and conventional ballistic and cruise
missiles, guided missiles for ship and air defence, torpedoes etc. To
reduce grey areas a criterion could be defined that ‘‘existing’’ means
‘‘deployed already in 2000’’.
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variable-wing aircraft and helicopters, plus special types
such as airships or paragliders.
For armed uninhabited fixed/variable wing aircraft and
helicopters national limits should be agreed globally or by
region. An idea on the national limits outside of Europe can
be gained from the ceilings of the Adapted CFE Treaty
(1999) (which is not in force), Table 1 lists them for
selected countries. Ideally the armed-UAV limits would be
markedly lower so that the totals over inhabited and
uninhabited combat aircraft and attack helicopters remain
in the same range.53
For globally active military powers limits in several regions
would hold in parallel. In case uninhabited heavy bombers
will be introduced, they should form a category of their own,
with special limits lower than those for the other combat air-
craft. For a global solution air vehicles of the navies with and
without crew will have to be regulated as well.
In case countries will put much emphasis on armed UAVs
that are significantly smaller than traditional combat aircraft
or attack helicopters (the empty masses of which are in the
range of 10–20 metric tons and 1–8 tons, respectively),54 it is
unrealistic to expect that these should count in the same way
as large ones. To accommodate these motives new sub-
categories could be introduced, with thresholds of empty
masses at, for example, 100 and 1,000 kg for combat aircraft
and 50 and 500 kg for attack helicopters. Taking into
account that smaller UAVs are cheaper, one can expect
arguments for much higher maximum holdings than for the
larger/heavier ones. However, acknowledging that high
numbers can bring specific possibilities for surprise attack
and destabilisation, the maximum holdings in the light-
weight armed-UAV categories should not transgress a few
times the limits in the normal-weight classes.
In order to maintain and increase military stability, at
some point it may become advisable to introduce qualita-
tive criteria beyond take-off mass which gives a rough
implicit limit on weapons payload. Further criteria usable
in the definition of refined armed-UAV categories are
mainly payload, maximum range and endurance; however,
these are less clearly defined and less easily verifiable.
Special kinds of armed UAVs need their own limits, as
soon as their introduction will become probable. For
example, for armed uninhabited airships probably the
limits can be very low, maybe zero. Armed paragliders
could become relevant threats so that their numbers should
be strictly limited.
To reduce ambiguity and support verification, types and
holdings of unarmed military UAVs should be notified.
New limits for armed UGVs
Introduction of armed uninhabited ground vehicles will
follow arming of UAVs with several to many years delay,
but limitation should be taken into view soon. Similarly to
the approach recommended for armed UAVs, national
limits for uninhabited battle tanks and armoured combat
vehicles should be defined so that totals (including inhab-
ited versions) are in line with the approach of the Adapted
Table 1 National limits for major weapon systems for ten selected countries in the Adapted CFE Treaty (1999) (not in force) (CFE Treaty 1999:
Protocol on National Ceilings)
State party Battle tanks Armoured combat vehicles (total) Pieces of artillery Combat aircraft Attack helicopters
Armenia 220 220 285 100 50
Belgium 300 989 288 209 46
Czech Republic 957 1,367 767 230 50
Germany 3,444 3,281 2,255 765 280
Norway 170 275 491 100 24
Russia 6,350 11,280 6,315 3,416 855
Turkey 2,795 3,120 3,523 750 130
Ukraine 4,080 5,050 4,040 1,090 330
UK 843 3,017 583 855 350
USA 1,812 3,037 1,553 784 396
Ceilings for sub-categories ‘‘Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicles’’ and ‘‘Heavy Armament Combat Vehicles’’ under ‘‘Armoured Combat
Vehicles’’ and footnotes for sub-ceilings in active units have been removed. The full table contains 30 countries
53 A treaty just covering armed UAVs would leave air vehicles with
crew on board without limits while both types would fulfill the same
missions in many cases. It is nevertheless justified due to new dangers
from UAVs. However, where achievable the approach taken by the
CFE Treaty should be taken: numerical limits on combat aircraft and
attack helicopters should hold independently of whether these are
uninhabited or not, with notification of types and holdings of unarmed
military air vehicles that are similar to armed ones.
54 Maximum take-off masses are in the range 15–40 t for combat
aircraft and 2–10 t for attack helicopters. Strategic bombers have




CFE Treaty (see the selected ceilings for Europe in
Table 1).55 As described for the CFE Treaty, categories
and limits for smaller armed UGVs may be needed.
Thresholds of unladen weights could be 100 and 1,000 kg,
respectively. Similarly to the case of UAVs, payload, range
and endurance could be used as additional qualitative cri-
teria. As with UAVs, types and holdings of unarmed UGVs
should be notified.
New limits for armed USVs and UUVs
Concerning maritime UVs, big ships as well as submarines
are not likely to be operated without human crews on
board. Uninhabited surface vehicles (USVs) ready for
deployment or in development are mostly motor boats,
with some semi-submersibles in addition. The lengths are
below 15 m, with light weapons and maybe a small cannon
on board (e.g. US DoD 2009: App. C.1). Compared with
battle ships and aircraft carriers, they provide only very
limited military capabilities, with little effect on military
stability. As long as this situation remains and their num-
bers remain limited, limitation of USVs is of secondary
importance. However, to prevent terrorist uses, at least
informal restraint is recommended.
Uninhabited undersea vehicles (UUVs), on the other
hand, could change the situation at sea in particular if they
could attack surface ships and submarines markedly more
effectively than present torpedoes. Limiting (new types of)
UUVs poses difficult problems of categorisation and veri-
fication and is intimately linked to the problem of maritime
arms control in general. Thus a separate agreement
focusing on UUVs would not be very useful to solve the
stability problem at sea, and states with navies are unlikely
to agree to such an approach. Proliferation to non-state
groups is not an urgent concern. As a consequence, UUVs
would best be treated within comprehensive regulation of
naval forces. Such regulation would be very difficult to
negotiate and would take a long time.
Should the judgements on USVs and/or UUVs change
before, specific limitations should be sought.
Verification
Verification of compliance with the proposed armed-UV
limits can mostly rely on established methods and means,
namely national technical means of verification (mainly
satellites), co-operative overflights with cameras56 and
above all on-site inspections with the right of access not
only to sites with holdings of limited vehicles, but also to
testing and training sites. Also for sites with holdings of
unarmed vehicles that are similar to armed ones there needs
to be a right of access. Inspection equipment should be
allowed similar to the CFE-Treaty rules.57 If new catego-
ries using mass thresholds are used, portable scales should
be added.58 In order to be prepared for a time when small
and very small armed UVs will become feasible and/or
small and very small UVs will be introduced into civilian
society, inspection protocols should allow the use of
magnifying equipment as well as contain provisions for
challenge inspections at non-military sites.59 As a pre-
requisite for successful inspections, notifications of the
existing types of armed UVs and unarmed similar ones
with regular updates and of the holdings at the various
locations are needed.
To check compliance with the requirement of human
control over armed-UV attacks, the ICRC should have
access to the recorded sensor, communication and control
data on request.
Export controls and transparency measures
In the field of export controls, UVs should be covered more
systematically. In particular the Hague Code of Conduct
should add cruise missiles (Gormley 2008) and other
UAVs. The Wassenaar Arrangement should be broadened
to cover also UGVs, USVs and UUVs.60
Concerning transparency measures, confidence and
security building measures such as the Vienna Document
for Europe would be useful in other regions, covering
armed UVs together with all other weapons systems. As
long as such comprehensive agreements will not be
achievable, special notification regimes concerning armed
UVs would help, maybe also as a first step towards sub-
stantial limitation agreements.
In the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms it
should be checked whether the definitions of its categories
should be augmented by explanations that armed UVs are
included.
55 Also here a common ceiling for inhabited and uninhabited armed
ground vehicles should be used where achievable, with notification of
types and holdings of unarmed military ground vehicles that are
similar to armed ones.
56 As in Europe plus USA and Canada under the Open Skies Treaty
(1992, in force) (Open Skies Treaty 1992).
57 Portable passive night vision devices, binoculars, video and still
cameras, dictaphones, tape measures, flashlights, magnetic compasses
and lap-top computers; other equipment needs approval of the
inspected State Party (CFE Treaty 1999: Protocol on Inspections).
58 The START I Treaty allows the use of ‘‘weighing devices’’ (beside
many other items, e.g. radiation detection equipment) (START I
1991).
59 The requirements would grow as mini-/microrobots would shrink
in size, or as insects would be implanted with electronics, a topic of
research already now (e.g. Bozkurt et al. 2009).
60 The latter beyond the notion of ,,underwater robots’’.
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Final remarks on recommendations
Table 2 summarises the arms-control options and recom-
mendations with the required verification methods. In actual
negotiations many details will have to be discussed and settled
about categories, limits, exceptions, verification methods. For
many such questions the CFE Treaty and the Vienna Docu-
ment can provide useful ideas. In other areas new ground will
have to be covered, for example concerning the inclusion of
civilian UVs in transparency measures and verification, or
with respect to the ban on autonomous targeting.
With the use of the term ‘‘vehicle’’ immobile armed
robots (weapons fixed at a site without a human operator in
the immediate vicinity) are excluded from the present
recommendations. Further research should investigate
whether their international limitation is useful and if so,
how it could be arranged.
The outlook for acceptance of the recommendations is
mixed. Given the strong increase in UAV attacks during
the last decade and the explicit goal of expansion of armed
UVs in the USA, and the intention of many more countries
to follow this role model, a complete ban is not realistic for
the time being. Additional difficulties arise from the pro-
pensity of democracies toward warfare with less risk to
their soldiers (Sauer and Scho¨rnig 2012). On the other
hand, democratic society opens the possibility for non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) and expert groups to
create public awareness. In the cases of anti-personnel land
mines and cluster munitions military interests in these
systems were overruled finally and prohibition conventions
were concluded, mainly because of civilian victims. Pres-
ent UAV attacks cause markedly fewer civilian casualties,
but their number is not insignificant (e.g. Woods and Ross
2012). Concerning the proposed ban on autonomous armed
UVs, the influential NGO Human Rights Watch has taken
up this demand (HRW/IHRC 2012). With respect to limits
on remotely controlled armed UVs, political action is
already required to maintain and revive some of the
existing regulation, all the more to expand it. But the
agreements in place provide important precedents to build
on for NGOs as well as for supportive states.
Conclusion
Armed UVs pose ethical issues not only with respect to their
use in armed conflict, but also concerning the prevention of
war. In order to prevent dangers for arms control, international
humanitarian law, for military stability as well as for society,
armed UVs should be limited, some categories should be
prohibited at all. Existing regulation, in particular the CFE
Treaty, encompasses armed UVs already, but additional pre-
ventive-arms-control measures are recommended.
This analysis has presented ideas for such measures.
Most urgent is the field of armed UAVs. Actual negotiation
requires designing categories, limitations and verification
methods in more detail. Given political will, the dangers
from armed UVs can be contained using established
methods of (preventive) arms control.
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